Beyond the unfinished regulationist conception of the international order

Conference on the ‘The history of regulation theory and its contributions to the analysis of global capitalism and its recent crises (Covid-19, Ukraine)’

Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, 8-9 september 2022

BENJAMIN BÜRBAUMER,
MAÎTRE DE CONFÉRENCES, SCIENCES PO BORDEAUX/CENTRE EMILE DURKHEIM
Introduction

A multitude of centrifugal tendencies in global capitalism (US-China rivalry, Covid, supply chain disruptions, soaring energy prices, war...)

Whither regulation theory?
- "Regulation theory has made little effort to theorise as such the international level of economic coordination" (Graz, 2003: 233)
- Methodological nationalism and a neglect of political dynamics (Bieling et al, 2016)

Importing IR theories (hegemonic stability, international regimes)

- Are these IR theories compatible with the core assumptions of regulation theory?

Argument: An unfinished regulationist conception of the international order
Introduction

1. Social groups and conflict at the root of regulation theory
2. From hegemonic stability to international regimes: a conceptual leap
3. Neoclassical foundations in international relations theories
4. Conclusion: Move on with Gramsci
1. Social groups and conflict at the root of regulation theory

‘the basic entities [of capitalism] are companies’ in which there is not a ‘pure market relationship’ but a ‘hierarchical subjugation’ of employees (Boyer, 2015a: 6)

‘reintroducing conflicting interests between classes and social groups’ (Boyer, 2015a: 161).

‘replace the principle of substantial rationality with that of contextual rationality’ (Boyer, 2015a: 109)
2. From hegemonic stability to international regimes: a conceptual leap

Kindleberger’s hegemonic stability theory

- -> Fordism (Boyer, 2015a: 240; Lipietz, 1987)

‘The decline of hegemony does not necessarily sound cooperation’s death knell’ (Keohane, 1984: 9)

New explanation: the international regime as a set of ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge’ (Krasner, 1982: 185)

- -> post-Fordism (Benko and Lipietz, 2002; Saillard and Boyer, 2002; Vidal, 2002)
2. From hegemonic stability to international regimes: a conceptual leap

Post-Fordist international order as ‘multipolar’ and ‘interdependent’ (Boyer, 2015a; Boyer, 2015b; Boyer, 2001; Boyer and Dehove, 2018)

Intertemporal gap: from a theory based on hierarchical international relations to another based on horizontal relations

A missing regulationist account of the international order
3. Neoclassical foundations in international relations theories

THE RATIONAL HEGEMON AGAINST GLOBAL MARKET FAILURES (KINDLEBERGER)

The state: restore the conditions of optimality

‘Be neoclassic without being systematically against state intervention, as long as the message about the optimality of the “market system” is preserved’ (Guerrien and Bénicourt, 2008: 89)

‘Samuelson’s most significant and pervasive obfuscation of reality lies in his treating of government as a benevolent, neutral, deus ex machina’ (Hunt and Lautzenheiser, 2015: 476)

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AS RATIONAL GAME (KEOHANE/KRASNER)

International regimes allow ‘the emergence of cooperation among egoists’ (Keohane, 1984)

States as rational, maximizing agents

Game theory ‘always depends upon the rules of the game’ (Fine and Milonakis, 2009)

-> IR theories juxtaposed on, rather than truly integrated into regulation theory
4. Conclusion: Move on with Gramsci

‘return to Antonio Gramsci’ (2015a: 175)

Gramsician thought as a way of completing a regulationist conception of the international order

Contested interdependence