La lettre de la régulation

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EDITORIAL
Le présent numéro de La lettre de la régulation comporte un "point théorique" développé en profondeur par Robert Guttmann, sur la théorie de la régulation et la monnaie. Le prochain numéro contiendra également une contribution substantielle de Yoshihiro Yamada et Yūsuke Inoue sur la théorie de la régulation et l'économie japonaise. Un autre point théorique, de Victor Soria, devrait proposer une synthèse sur le cas de l'économie mexicaine. Ces contributions, qui permettent de faire le point sur un sujet et offrent une résonance bibliographique importante, semblent correspondre à une demande. Vos propres contributions restent les bienvenues. Elles peuvent aussi constituer une analyse critique de publications récentes.

La rédaction de la lettre de la régulation

POINT THÉORIQUE

MONEY IN REGULATION THEORY

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From its very inception in the late 1970s, Regulation Theory (RT) has made important contributions to clarify the role of money in our economic system (Aghion, 1976, Boyer and Meisel, 1978, Lipietz, 1979). In this regard, RT has continued a long tradition of heterodox thinkers, beginning with Marx and Keynes, for whom money was the starting point for theoretical alternatives to the (essentially non-monetary) equilibrium models of the neoclassical orthodoxy.

Regulationists have done a very good job identifying the monetary conditions of both the postwar boom and the subsequent stagnation crises of the 1970s. But they have been less successful analyzing the combination of financial crisis and monetary deregulation during the 1980s. The significance of these developments for a possible transition towards a new accumulation regime remains therefore an unanswered question, necessitating a more focused research agenda.

1. The Regulationist View of Money

RT presents a comprehensive view of money which integrates monetary processes with the general accumulation dynamics of an advanced capitalist economic system. In that theory money is identified as one of five institutional pillars - besides the wages relation, the nature of competition, multilateral arrangements governing international economic relations, and the forms of state intervention - which together determine how our system reproduces itself. In other words, the Regulationists analyze money as one of the factors defining the mode of regulation of the prevailing accumulation regime (Boyer, 1986). Such an analysis implies certain characteristics of money which set RT apart from such heterodox alternatives, as the Post Keynesian theory of the "monetary production economy" (Davidson, 1972), the neo-Ricardian theory of the "dynamic circuit" (Parguez, 1975), or the "social structure of accumulation" approach of Radical Political Economists in the United States (Bouvès, Gordon, Weisstein, 1983).

*RT conceives money as a social institution, subject to historic change. In this context much emphasis is placed on the institutional evolution of money and relations in the modus operandi of different money forms.

*Money, as sole representative of income, has a special mediating force in social market relations that make up our economic system. These relations (i.e., the wage relation, credit, competition between producers, relations between nation-states) are characterized by both conflict and interdependence, crystallized in the fact that anyone's ability to earn income depends on someone else. Every market participant faces a monetary constraint, the need to sell one's product or resource for income before being able to spend (De Brumhoff, 1976, 1979). The issue and circulation of money determines to a large extent how this monetary constraint plays itself out in our economy.

*Representing income, money also serves as the most liquid form of capital at the center of the accumulation process. Investors, be the industrial of financial, spend money now in order to make more money later. Income-generating activities - exchange, production, or credit - thus take the form of interconnected monetary circuits which integrate (historic) time and (social) space in our cash-flow economy.

*As representative of income and most liquid form of capital, money plays a crucial role in shaping the growth pattern of capitalist economies. That pattern is typically an unstable one, characterized by fairly short business-cycle fluctuations and longer-term sequences of expansion and stagnation. RT captures the latter dimension of growth with its concept of "accumulation regimes" of which the modalities governing the payments and credit system are a constituent element.

2. Credit-Money and the Intensive Accumulation Regime

Following the collapse of the gold standard and the global banking system in the early 1930s, the industrial nations built a new monetary system based on credit money. This new money form, basically "flat" money consisting of either private bank deposits or governments-supplied coins and notes, is created in acts of credit extension. It thus constitutes elastic currency whose issue responds endogenously to the liquidity needs of the economy.

Leaving the automatic discipline imposed by specie reserves under the gold standard, credit-money needs to be managed by the state instead. Central bank management of the money supply rests on controlling the nation's payments system through which the monetary authorities guarantee the convertibility of different money forms and manipulate the money-creation capacity of private banks (De Brumhoff, 1971, 1973).

For a quarter of a century following World War II, the central banks of most industrial nations allowed a fairly rapid growth of domestic money supplies to keep interest rates low. This expansionary monetary policy supported continuous debt-financing by monetizing a portion of the new debts through automatic...
liquidity injections. Hence it became much easier for economic agents to spend beyond current income levels. Such debt-financed excess spending (Minsky, 1964, 1982) whenever characterized as an "overdraft economy," was essential to the proper functioning of the new intensive accumulation regime emerging during the postwar period. Various channels of excess spending, each tied to a particular institutional pillar of that regime, combined to create a lasting worldwide boom:

- Rapid money-supply growth, implying ample bank credit at low interest rates, made it possible for industries to finance the large investment projects associated with Fordist mass production technology.
- The same monetary process boosted aggregate demand sufficiently to relax the monetary constraint of producers. This, in turn, encouraged the monopolistic regulation of prices and wages, including a more moderate process of devalorizing capital, by means of depreciation allowances that are built into the output by costs and hence become part of corporate cash flows (Aghion, 1980; Gutmann, 1982).
- Generous consumer credit allowed middle-class households to undertake large ticket purchases, in particular cars and homes, around which the social norms of mass consumption came to be built.
- Automatic debt monetization by the central bank's open market operations supported government efforts to build a "Welfare State" and to run larger budget deficits when the domestic economy needed stimulation.
- The international monetary system established at Bretton Woods towards the end of World War II, which a decade later had become a pure credit-money standard when U.S. gold reserves no longer sufficed to back all the dollars in international circulation, provided for massive U.S. capital exports to the rest of the world. Those global liquidity injections boosted trade and, by facilitating the "catch-up" of other industrial nations, also gave the world economy a more symmetrically balanced growth pattern.

The postwar boom ended around 1970 primarily because of mounting contradictions within the Fordist model of industrial accumulation; most notably a breakdown in the balance between wage growth and productivity gains. But credit-money contributed to the erosion of the intensive accumulation regime as well. Continuous debt-financing eventually began to weaken the balance sheets of many borrowers and created conditions of spreading financial fragility (Minsky, 1964, 1982). Moreover, the growing de-facto inconvertibility and overvaluation of the dollar weakened Bretton Woods to the point where that system collapsed in August 1971. This decisive event led to increasingly volatile exchange rates, competitive devaluations as a new form of protectionism, chronic imbalances in trade and capital flows, global transmission of inflationary pressures, and finally a debt crisis of developing countries amid global recession (Gutmann, 1985). During that decade of monetary instability industrial nations experienced slowing growth and accelerating inflation. RT has done an excellent job analyzing this stagflation as a new form of structural crisis in which accelerated money creation in response to growing borrowing needs helped to moderate the crisis-induced destruction of capital, but only at the expense of continuously devaluing money (Benassy, Boyer, and Golpi, 1979; Aghion and Orlean, 1982; Lipietz, 1979, 1983; De Vroey, 1984a, 1984b).

3. The Regime of Credit-Money in Transition

In recent years RT has focused more on model-building and the specific aspects of an accumulation regime in transition (e.g., technology, labor markets), and on comparative studies illustrating growing differentiation in crisis-reorganization experiences. Such specialization has made it more difficult to analyze the role of money which is best undertaken within the kind of general-theoretical framework that characterized the origins of RT. Yet, since 1980, we have witnessed a major transformation of our credit system with profound implications for the ongoing reorganization of the accumulation regime (Gutmann, 1985, 1986). In a more comprehensive study of this process (Gutmann, 1986) 1 have identified several dimensions of structural change concerning credit-money all of which are reshaping the relationship between finance and industry.

1. Systemic Financial Instability: The worldwide recession and tight monetary policies of the early 1980s broke the cost-price spiral of stagflation, but only at the expense of triggering deflation adjustments in sectors that during the 1970s had benefited from the redistributional effects of inflation (e.g., energy, agriculture, commodity-producing developing countries, real estate). These sectoral depressions created heavy bad-debt losses for banks. In addition, the credit system has recently become more unstable because of the proliferation of new financial products carrying significant risks, growing ties between banks and nonbank institutions, and the rapid globalization of banking. As the monetary authorities expanded their lender-of-last-resort interventions to cope with new kinds of financial crises, they weakened the disciplining force of market failure and encouraged even greater risk taking among banks and other lenders. This so-called "moral hazard" problem might be overcome by tighter supervision of aggressive institutions and/or differentiating deposit insurance premiums and bank capital requirements based on riskiness.

2) Price Deregulation: Stagflation-induced manifestations of financial instability forced policy-makers to abandon their attempts at controlling exchange rates (in 1973) and interest rates (after 1979). That deregulation has had several important consequences. As banks introduced a new generation of deposits combining both transaction and investment elements, central bank targeting of monetary aggregates has become more difficult. In addition, the restoration of price competition has forced banks to attract funds by offering higher deposit rates and to reinvest those costlier funds in higher-yielding, but correspondingly riskier, assets. With their cost subject to greater rate fluctuations, banks have also tried to transfer the price risk onto borrowers by charging them adjustable rates. The spread of variable-rate deposits and loans has altered the dynamic of the business cycle by removing the combination of devaluation and loan rationing, which during the late 1960s and 1970s had repeatedly triggered short and sharp credit crunches near cyclical peaks, with a more gradual, yet longer-lasting process of run-off whenever sustained increases of interest rates on old and new loans began to burden borrowers. Moreover, greater financial market volatility in the wake of deregulated exchange and interest rates has encouraged much greater volumes of short-term capital flows for speculative or hedging purposes. Finally, market-determined currency prices and credit costs have contributed to even higher "real" (i.e., inflation-adjusted) interest rates which have reinforced the monetary constraint faced by producers and depressed industrial investment activity.

3) The "Marketization" of the Credit System: Dramatic advances in computer and communications technology, besides transforming the payments system (e.g., electronic fund transfers) as well as banking services (e.g., automated teller machines), have created significant economies of scope and scale in banking. At the same time, vastly improved access to data about firms and markets has deprived banks of their traditional information advantage regarding their corporate clients. As corporations and investors no longer need the intermediation services of banks and prefer to deal directly with each other, securities have come to replace bank loans as the major source of external funds. Computer-based automation of trading and settlements only reinforces this trend by increasing the volume capacity of securities markets.
4) The Globalization of Capital: The deregulated Eurocurrency markets, globally diversified investment portfolios of institutional investors, worldwide funding strategies of multinationals, and computer networks linking national capital markets have all contributed to make financial capital highly mobile across the globe. Industrial capital follows this trend with the formation of global production networks. These developments carry the embryonic ingredients for a new global accumulation regime. Yet such a regime cannot emerge in coherent fashion, as long as the world economy operates within the international monetary system currently in place. The multiliteracy system with flexible exchange rates, which evolved over the last two decades following the collapse of Bretton Woods, is deeply flawed, not least because national currencies per se cannot function effectively as world money. Manifestations of this structural deficiency include persistent external imbalances, asymmetrical adjustment burdens, volatile currency and commodity prices, massive speculation, and heightened stop-go policy constraints. Even worse, the recent arrangements encourage new forms of protectionism, especially the formation of regional trading blocs and monetary "zones of influence" by the power issuing the key currencies - the United States, Germany, and Japan. This propensity clashes directly with the globalization of capital, a contradiction that is exacerbated by the ossification of traditional capital and exchange controls.

4. The Dual Nature of Financial Capital

The ongoing reorganization of our monetary regime raises anew key questions about the role of finance in advanced capitalist economies. Financial capital, a quintessential force in economic development, actually comprises two separate dimensions (see Marx's distinction between loan capital and money-lending activities in Volume III of Capital or the juxtaposition of "enterprise" and "speculation" by Keynes in his General Theory). One is finance capital, centered on the supply of loanable funds by banks to industry; the other is fictitious capital involving the shuffling around of mere paper assets (e.g. corporate shares, government bonds, futures contracts, cash-management accounts) which do not have any direct counterpart in industrial capital formation. The first constitutes productive activity; the second does not.

Concerning finance capital, most industrial nations have confirmed the prediction of Hilferding (1910) that banks and industrial enterprises would become tightly integrated combines based on cross ownership ties. This is especially true in Germany, where banks hold large equity positions in manufacturing, as well as in Japan whose economy is dominated by multi-firm networks called "keiretsu". The United States, however, presents an exception to this trend. Economic populism, a strong political tradition that resisted in particular excessive concentration of power in the hands of the large East Coast banks, has prevented American banks from owning the shares of industrial enterprises and organizing the securities markets.

There are, however, clear signs that the two models might converge gradually. Europe and Japan are discovering the virtues of highly developed securities markets in terms of supplying venture capital, providing a continuous market evaluation of performance, facilitating industrial reorganization, and promoting economic democracy. Their realization is helped by the growing "securitization" of credit made possible by computer-based automation and financial innovation. The United States, on the other hand, may soon decide to strengthen its banking sector by removing remaining regulatory barriers between commercial banks and investment banks as well as between banking and commerce. This convergence would make it easier to harmonize national financial regulations, a key prerequisite for proper international monetary reform towards supranational credit-money.

The creation of an international regulatory framework for money and banking will, however, not succeed in giving the emerging global accumulation regime a necessary degree of cohesion and stability unless it manages to contain one of the most disturbing trends of the last two decades, the truly explosive expansion of fictitious capital. Financial futures in particular have turned speculation from a temporary (boom-related) phenomenon into a permanent activity. And industrial firms, instead of reinvesting their profits productively, prefer to engage in purely financial transactions where returns come sooner and may be higher. This priority contributes to global stagnation which in turn feeds the chase for paper profits, a vicious cycle that has to be broken for global recovery to have any chance.

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Changement technique, industrie


Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 2, n°3, 1993, a rassemblé les contributions suivantes:
J.G. March, H.A. Simon, Organizations revisited
R. Hartman, D. Teece, W. Mitchell, T. Jorde, Assessing market power in regimes of rapid technological change
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Amérique latine
Nueva Economía, Año 2, n°2, juin 1993, Organo de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias Económicas (Palermo de las Academias), Bolíva a San Francisco a Caracas a Venezuela, a rassemblé les contributions suivantes:
Carlos Quenan, Robert Rollini, Sistemas financieros y desarrollo de América Latina : Experiencia histórica y problemas actuales
Armando Córdova, América Latina y el Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional
Feusto Burqueño, El Nuevo Orden en un mundo intolerable y desigual : Cooperación Sur-Sur y el desafío para el desarrollo
Tomas Enrique Carrillo Batalla, El Dolar. Aproximación a la historia de una unidad monetaria
José Ignacio Casar Pérez, Evolución del impacto de las políticas comerciales y cambiarias sobre el parir de comercio exterior y especialización de los países miembros de la ALADI
LES MONDES DE PRODUCTION de R. Salaïs et M. Storper
présentation de Martin Botzmeyer


L’analyse est concrétisée par une sélection utile d’indicateurs économiques de la firme permettant de repérer la position de celle-ci dans les mondes de production. C’est ce qui sera effectivement mis en œuvre pour un ensemble d’entreprises ayant émergé au Fonds Industriel de Modernisation (FIM), apportant des éléments empiriques nombreux. L’entreprise joue en effet un rôle essentiel dans la coordination. Elle doit assurer la cohérence entre des attentes diverses. Le critère de “résultat d’un produit”, autrement dit le critère de cohérence entre des mondes distincts, retenu par Salaïs et Storper, est la rentabilité qu’il procure. Délégué de test de cohérence, ce critère devient au fil des pages l’objectif unique de l’entreprise. Si bien que cette norme va sans doute déterminer les cadres d’accord que construisent les agents : mais si la nature de la firme est d’adapter des intérêts contradictoires à une contrainte dominante de réalisation d’un profit, on peut penser que le jeu de la coordination se révèle singulièrement biaisé. Nécessairement pas alors d’abord l’asymétrie de position entre les agents qui dominent les relations au sein de la firme, plutôt que leur vocation à se coordonner pour construire un bien commun ?

La théorie des auteurs leur permet de revisiter et discuter des grandes options de l’économie industrielle actuelle : économies de variété plutôt qu’économies d’échelle, apprentissage, avantages à la coordination de branches. L’accent est mis naturellement sur la question de la qualité des produits, construite au travers de relations stables et stables entre producteurs et demandeurs. Le modèle industriel (standardisation des tâches, objets définis par des nomenclatures, État planificateur), réducteur d’emplois, est en voie d’abandon où devrait l’être, comme le montrent les études d’entreprises.

En filigrane, c’est un projet de sortie de crise qu’essaiment les auteurs, autour d’un modèle d’apprentissage technologique, les pays se spécialisant sur une gamme de produits avec innovation continue. Reste une incertitude : si des principes de coordination distincts peuvent coexister, le plus probable est qu’ils donnent naissance à un monde pluriforme, sans hiérarchie entre les conventions, ou ne va-t-on pas vers la substitution d’un modèle de coordination dominé par un autre ? Les auteurs ne tranchent pas et c’est légitime. On dégagerait pourtant de ces péripéties le constat que de l’ordre soit de l’ordre, ou d’utiliser le matériel de ou mais que. Ainsi, à l’heure où quelques grandes firmes financières mondialement dominent dans le champ des échanges économiques, on est en droit de s’interroger : sur le seuil de ce qui pourrait être, par exemple, le résultat d’une généralisation d’accords interpersonnels dans les firmes, plutôt que des accords négociés centralement.

Mais la thèse a encore une portée plus générale : elle vise à étendre l’usage de concepts conventionnels vers une compréhension des régularités économiques nationales, notamment en explorant une théorie de l’État. La théorie des conventions est-elle mère pour cela ? C’est en tout cas le pari des auteurs. Le risque d’une démarche trop hâtive en ce sens est l’appauvrissement (par trop grande généralisation) des concepts et le recours à d’autres types d’approches, plus intuitives, pour consolider la construction. Ce n’est pas sans impact sur la portée des recommandations émises : les pressions de position pour une plus grande flexibilité des mondes de production pourraient gagner en prudence. Ainsi, lorsque les auteurs mettent en garde contre “le langage des droits formels (qui serait) incompatible avec le registre des mondes interpersonnels” (p.346) ou lorsqu’ils plaisent pour un “État modeste”, ils hésitent à y voir une conséquence logique du modèle ou une intime conviction, toute légitime, mais qui ne se situerait pas sur le même plan.

D’un point de vue méthodologique, on retrouvera un débat déjà évoqué dans ces colonnes entre tenants des Conventions et de la Régulation : l’ouvrage contribue à préciser les termes du débat, sans forcément aller dans le sens d’un équilibre de l’espace entre les deux collines. L’opposition réaffirmée à toute approche holiste oblige à considérer que l’adaptation, pour chaque entreprise, des mondes de production à la contrainte de rentabilité aboutit automatiquement à une compatibilité macro-économique entre les formes d’ordre et d’organisation. Il est pourtant nécessaire que l’accord sur la qualité puisse assurer durablement cette compatibilité pour un produit, rien ne permet de le penser pour l’ensemble d’une économie nationale. Ne va-t-on pas plutôt assister à un déplacement permanent vers les mondes plus flexibles, donc à un accroissement de la concurrence, à la compression des coûts et finalement à la remise en cause de la convention de qualité ? Notons enfin que l’introduction d’institutions appelées à suppléer aux dispositions de coordination ne répond à ce dilemme que sous l’hypothèse forte que les agents ont conscience de ces désinsaisies et que cette conscience suffit à assurer la constitution des institutions nécessaires.
EAEPE 1994 CONFERENCE

‘Challenges to Institutional and Evolutionary Economic Theory: Growth, Uncertainty and Change’
Copenhagen, Denmark, 27-29 October 1994

CALL FOR PAPERS

The EAEPE 1994 conference in Copenhagen will face up to the challenges to institutional and evolutionary economics. It is intended to foster a debate not only with neoclassical economics but also with the Post Keynesian, Marxist, Schumpeterian, Austrian, behaviouralist and other alternatives. The aim will be to explore both points of difference and the common background. The list of topics covered will include economic growth, structural change, institutions, and uncertainty. The overall goal will be to help build the theoretical foundations of institutional and evolutionary economic theory.

Participants wishing to submit papers are invited to send a title with a 400-600 word abstract to Klaus Nielsen, Economics and Planning Institute, Roskilde University Centre, Box 360, DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark. ☎️ (45) 46 75 77 11, FAX: (45) 46 75 66 18. Priority will be given to abstracts submitted before 2 March 1994. If the paper can be fitted into the conference schedule then a final version will be requested by 5 September 1994 and this also should be sent to Klaus Nielsen in Denmark. Final papers should be typed clearly, suitably for reprography, have adequate margins and cover no more than 20 sides of A4 or quarto. They may be single or double spaced, reduced on a photocopier or otherwise. The Scientific Committee reserve the right to exclude papers which are illegible or in excess of 20 sides.

PAN-EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC NETWORKS

With the support of the Copernicus Programme of the EC (DGXI) a Pan European Network has been set up to develop research in institutional and evolutionary economics. The funding lasts until September 1996.

The centres and coordinators of this project are as follows:

- Ženy Hausner, Krakow Academy of Economics, Poland
- Geoff Hodgson, University of Cambridge, UK
- Pavel Mertlik, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
- Andrew Tylecote, Sheffield University Management School, UK

The network will be widened to other institutions, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Members of academic institutions in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are invited to contact Pavel Mertlik (Institute of Economic Science, Charles University, Smetanovo nábřeží 6, 110 01 Prague 1 - Institute of Economic Science, Slovak Republic, ☎️ 42 2 24 81 08 04, FAX: 42 2 24 81 09 07). Members of academic institutions in Poland are invited to contact Ženy Hausner (Academy of Economics, ul. Rakowicka 27, 31-510 Krakow, Poland. ☎️ 12 22 69 19, FAX: 12 22 69 24, Email: enhausne@p.krak.sc) Other academic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe will also be considered.